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1  Introduction 
Why does the European Union need to reassess its Korea policy now? 
The Union has a considerable strategic and  longtenn interest in the  security, political 
stability and  prosper~ty of the Republic of Korea
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•  Economically,  in just a  few  years 
South Korea has established itself as  one of the Union's leading trade and investment 
partners. Politically, we have an interest in the development of this still young and - in 
some ways- fragile democracy.  Also, the divided Peninsula is a security flashpoint of 
global concern.  North Korea is perhaps the most unpredictable and impenetrable state in · 
the world.  A crisis on the peninsula would have far-reaching consequences in the region 
and beyond. 
There are more immediate reasons to review policy towards South Korea at this moment. 
·The country is now in a phase of economic transformation.  The financial crisis of 1997 
exposed an urgent need for wholesale reform of the economy.  After his election at the 
height of the crisis,  President Kim Dae-jung has  initiated this process, in coordination 
with the IMF.  South Korea has made perhaps the most impressive start to reform of  any 
of  the affected Asian economies. 
After the  Presidential  election,  there  is  also  the  prospect  of political  reform  through 
strengthening of democracy  and  human  rights  in  South  Korea.  In  addition,  if they 
successfully replace the country's former model of  dirigisme and "crony capitalism" with 
a more market-based system, reforms in the economic sphere will also ultimately have a 
profound political impact.  By changing the way the financial and corporate sectors, the 
public sector and the labour market operate, the new Government's reform agenda has 
the potential to reshape South Korean society. 
President Kim has adopted a radically new "sunshine" policy aimed at defusing tensions 
with Pyongyang.  The threat of damaging instability on the Peninsula would be greatly 
reduced if  these efforts succeeded. 
For these reasons, South Korea itself- and the wider situation on the Peninsula- are at a 
critical  turning  point.  The  EU  has  a  strong  interest  in  the  success of economic and 
political  reform  in  South  Korea  - leading  to  a  true  market  economy  and  a  vibrant 
democracy in stabler regional conditions. 
These outcomes all depend to a greater or lesser extent on whether the new leadership is 
able to steer its project to a successful conclusion.  It is therefore in the Union's interest 
to  give  critical  but finn support to  its  campaign for  economic and political change in 
Sot.tth  Korea  and  in  inter-Korean  relations.  This  argues  for  a  thorough  and  critical 
The  official  name  of  the  country  is  "the  Republic  of  Korea".  However,  for  ease  of 
comprehension,  the  term  "South  Korea"  is  used  throughout  this  Communication,  which  also 
refers to North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of  Korea). 
.I assessment of Union policy towards South Korea and the  Korean Peninsula generally, 
and for more active engagement. 
2  A major economic partner, despite the crisis 
2.1  .  An overview of  the Union's economic relations with South Korea 
In  1995
2  South  Korean  accumulated  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  in  the  Union 
amounted  to  ECU 2.3  billion against  ECU  1.5  billion  by  the  Union  in  South Korea. 
South Korean investment flows  increased rapidly in 1996 and  1997 until the financial 
crisis caused delay and cancellation of a series of  projects.  From a low base, Union FDI 
11ows into South Korea have been rising and in 1998 so far the Union has overtaken the 
USA and Japan as the largest investor in South Korea. 
In  1996  South  Korea  was the  Union's  4th  largest  trade  partner  outside  the  European 
continent (after the USA, Japan and China) and its 9th largest overall.  Last year, bilateral 
trade was worth ECU 27.5 billion.  The trade of the Union's fifteen Member States with 
South Korea has doubled in ten. years.  In 1997, the Union was South Korea's 3'd largest 
trading partner after the USA  and Japan and well ahead of  China in 4th place. 
Overall  the  trade  relationship has been beneficial for  both parties.  Although bilateral 
trade  balances are  not especially meaningful when looked at in isolation,  it should be 
recalled that every year from  1994  to  1997 saw a Union surplus, peaking at ECU 3.3 
billion in 1996.  Despite this, serious market-access concerns remained in South Korea: 
•  Periodic displays of popular hostility towards imports.  Despite South Korea's 
dependence on trade for its prosperity, past Governments hesitated to condemn 
such behaviour until prompted by international partners. 
•  Lack  of transparency  and  predictability  in  the  business  environment  which 
increased the costs of  entering the Sout~  Korean market and operating there. 
•  In some areas, laws discriminating against imports or foreign companies. 
•  Distortions in the financial  system which allowed South Korean companies to 
make huge investments in sectors such as shipbuilding, semi-conductors, cars, 
without apparent regard for world demand, or for profitability. 
South  Korea's progress  in  liberalising  its  economy  had,  until  this year,  proceeded far 
more slowly than the Union and other partners had been urging. It had been moving in 
the  right  direction  for  some years  and to  a  degree  had picked  up  pace  thanks to  the 
Uruguay Round and to  OECD accession in  late  1996.  However,  frustration  remained 
high about bureaucratic inertia and resistance to reform. 
The most recent year for which figures on FDI stocks are available.· 
2 2.2  Causes and consequences of  South Korea's financial crisis 
The economic policies of the  1960s and  1970s were geared to  export-oriented growth. 
Before the mid-1990s, South Korea's economy grew at an. average annual rate of 8.6% 
for 30 years.  Although the policies successfully initiated rapid industrialisation, failure to 
abandon them subsequently stored up structural shortcomings in the economy. 
Direct Government control of commercial banks until the early  1980s left South Korea 
with  a  financial  sector  ill-suited  for  allocating  resources  efficiently  within  a  modem 
market economy.  The equity market was under-developed.  Capital flows were heavily 
restricted.  As a result, lending and investment decisions were distorted over a prolonged 
period.  These systemic weaknesses lurked beneath the surface (even while headline GOP 
growth rates  remained  spectacular)  until  the  financial  crisis of late  1997,  which they 
precipitated. 
The chronology of the crisis has been amply documented by commentators elsewhere. 
The focus in this Communication is rather on the policy implications for the Union, in its 
dealings with South Korea.  In these terms, the crisis was significant because for the first 
time South Korean politicians, officials and public opinion began to  understand that  a 
dean break with  the  former  dirigiste  model  was  urgently  needed.  The  Government 
therefore  committed  to  far-reaching  structural  reform  as  part  of  the  Stand-by 
Arrangement concluded with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in December 1997. 
2.3  Updating economic relations with South Korea after the crisis 
2.3.1  Supporting the reform and recovery process in South Korea 
Premises 
As the Commission pointed out in  1994
3
,  sustainable growth in Asia is  in  the Union's 
interests politically,  because it  maintains stability, and economically,  since prosperous 
consumers and successful companies arc potential customers for the Union's companies. 
The  Union  therefore  welcomes  the  positive  start of South Korean  restructuring.  This 
process needs  to  continue,  be  far-reaching,  and  take  the  pursuit of sustainability  into 
account. 
Progress to date in South Korea's restructuring process 
Since  late  1997, the  new Government has  set out an impressive  reform agenda.  The 
initial measures taken so far to implement this agenda have also been clear steps in the 
right direction. But there are areas (bankruptcy law, corporate restructuring, etc) where so 
far  progress  has  been  insufficient  to  remove  the  underlying  causes of South  Korea's 
economic problems. 
However, the further restructuring measures which remain necessary are  certain to  test 
social cohesion (unemployment, which has risen dramatically from  around 2.5% in 1997 
to almost 8% by mid-1998, has not yet peaked).  They also face opposition from vested 
interests,  especially  industrial  conglomerates.  These  "chaebol"  arc  powerful  but 
unaccountable  forces  in  South  Korea:  their  economic  hegemony  is  threatened  by 
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3 attempts to  inject greater transparency and competition into the economy and they arc 
therefore  campaigning,  both  openly and  behind the  scenes,  to  dilute  President  Kim's 
reforn1s. 
There  is  therefore  deep-rooted  resistance  to  full  implementation of the  Government's 
restmcturing agenda.  Accordingly, its overall success is by no means assured. But these 
obstacles need to be overcome in the long-term interests of South Korea and its economic 
partners.  The Union should therefore continue to monitor the restmcturing process and 
ensure that IMF commitments are scmpulously respected. 
There has been progress in the regulatory framework for financial-sector supervision.  A 
new  "super-regulator",  the  Financial  Supervisory  Commission  (FSC),  will  enforce 
stricter standards of  transparency, thereby improving market discipline over banks. Rules 
on  ownership of financial  institutions  arc  being  relaxed,  in  principle  allowing  100% · 
foreign  owncrship
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•  Public  funds  to  take  over  bad  loans  from  banks  which  commit 
themselves  to  restructuring  arc  being  significantly  increased.  Five  insolvent  banks 
deemed incapable of  rehabilitation were identified for forced takeover in June 1998.  This 
is  a start, but cannot be the end of the story given the accumulation of bad debt in the 
South Korean banking sector. 
An efficient market-based banking sector is necessary to  help prevent some of the past 
excesses of  the corporate sector.  In pursuit of  greater market discipline over the chaebol, 
the  Government is  pressing them to  publish consolidated accounts and  eliminate debt 
guarantees  between  group  subsidiaries.  Measures  have  been  taken  to  strengthen 
corporate governance. Market discipline should also be improved by the opening of  bond 
and equity markets to foreign participation, and lifting restrictions on hostile takeovers. 
European Union actions in support of  the restructuring process 
In  the  crisis,  the  Union contributed  substantially to  stabilisation,  through  its  Member 
States' significant role in the international .financial rescue package co-ordinated by the 
IMF.  Although the overall package is widely perceived as having been led by the USA, 
in  fact  the Union's financial  contribution is  larger.  Union Member States contributed 
over $5.9 billion bilaterally to the "second line of defence", against $5.0 billion for the 
USA. 
The Union is supporting the reform efforts itself in several ways.  The ASEM Tmst Fund 
at  the  World  Bank - in  which the  EU is  playing a  leading role  - is  supporting  both 
financial-sector restmcturing and to tackling the social fall-out of  the crisis in the affected 
countries.  The  Union  is  also  creating  the  European  Financial  Expertise  Network 
("EFEX"), which will be made available to  South Korea and the other countries of the 
region,  in  support of their rcstmcturing efforts.  At the  second  Asia-Europe  Meeting 
(ASEM  II  - London,  April  1998)  European  Union leaders  and  Asian  leaders jointly 
signalled their resolve to alleviate the crisis by maintaining an open trading systein in the 
face of new protectionist pressures.  This "ASEM Trade and Investment Pledge" set the 
tone for the response of other world leaders to the crisis- for example, in the G7 and the 
Takeovers  remain  subject  to_ an  important  discretionary  element  from  the  authorities.  The 
justification advanced for this  is  at least partly the need to  prevent direct chaebol takeovers of 
commercial banks. 
4 WTO.  Also flowing from ASEM II, a number of EU Member States and the European 
Commission  have  led  high-profile  business  missions  to  South  Korea,  to  explore 
investment opportunities and to signal support for the country's restructuring. 
The  Union  should  continue  to  give  strong  political  support  to  the  reform  process.  It 
should give due and proper credit to President Kim and his Government for their efforts 
to date.  However, it should not be uncritical:  on the contrary, it should remain vigilant. 
There  arc  areas  where  reform  has  clearly  not  been  sufficient.  For  example,  the 
introduction  of effective  and  transparent  bankruptcy  arrangements  is  long  overdue. 
Restructuring  by  the  chaebol themselves has  mostly  been timid,  and  the  Government 
needs to maintain proper pressure on them to change. 
Concerns  continue  to  be  raised  by  European  industry  about  international  financial 
assistance  allegedly  used  to  subsidise  unviable  capacity  which  companies  would · 
otherwise have to  close.  There is  as  yet no  evidence of this, but the Commission has 
made  clear to  the  Korean authorities  that  we  will  continue  to  monitor this  area very 
elosely.  Any such behaviour would be contrary to the spirit of the international rescue 
package.  It would also be unacceptable to the Union, given the job losses which have 
occurred here in the past as sectors such as shipbuilding have restructured.  Transparency 
from the South Korean authorities and respect for both the IMF Stand-By Agreement and 
for  the  non-interventionist  economic  policy  set  out  by  President  Kim  are  essential 
minimum requirements to avoid suspicions that international assistance is contributing, 
directly or indirectly, to unfair competition. It is equally necessary that in the future the 
iinancial sector will grant loans exclusively on the basis of market principles (interest 
rates  based on risk and  cost of refinancing,  prudential  rules,  risk analysis  taking into 
account supply and demand). This is particularly important with regard to the chaebol. 
2.3.2  Improving market access, in the interest of both partners 
Premises 
Despite  piecemeal  progress  since the  early  1980s,  market  access  in  South  Korea has 
remained deeply problematic because of sectoral  and systemic barriers to  imports and 
investment.  As a result, competition on South Korea's domestic market is reduced, with 
adverse effects for consumers and for the international competitiveness of South Korean 
companies.  Trade  liberalisation  is  therefore  included  as  an  integral  part  of  the 
Government's  Stand-by  Arrangement  with  the  IMF,  because  both  sides  clearly 
recognised that a more open market was in South Korea's own economic interest. 
Action to remove these serious market-access barriers which remain would also be in the 
interests of the Union.  Notwithstanding its current setbacks, the Korean market retains 
considerable potential beyond the short term.  It has a population of over 46 million and 
is widely expected to return to a trend growth-rate of 5-6% per annum from 2000-1.  In 
1996, per capita GNP was over $10,000, ahead of  most of  Asia. 
5 Libcralisation measures since the financial crisis 
The  Government's reforms  in the  trading  sphere  have  been  timid.  There  have  been 
limited  improvements  in  some  areas:  certain  WTO-:incompatible  practices
5  arc 
apparently being eliminated ahead of the  previously agreed  schedule.  The number of 
goods subject to special adjustment tariffs has been reduced. 
The investment climate has seen greater changes, with attraction of foreign investment a 
top  Government  priority.  The  list  of sectors  reserved  exclusively  for  South  Korean 
companies  has  been  cut;  purchase  of real-estate  by  foreigners  has  been  liberalised; 
legislation allowing I 00% foreign ownership of  companies has been introduced. 
Next steps 
The Union should advocate continued market-opening, underlining that this will support 
South Korea's recovery.  It should assist by sharing its  experience of simplifying and · 
removing  burdensome  regulation,  as  applied  in  creating  its  Internal  Market.  Over-
burdensome  and  sometimes  discriminatory  regulations  applying  to  goods  (e.g. 
pharmaceuticals, cosmetics,  automobiles,  agricultural  produce)  and services (e.g.  legal 
services) continue to hamper economic activity in South Korea.  This is not acceptable to 
the Union, and needs to be rectified. 
Current  economic  difficulties  in  South  Korea  should  not  be  an  excuse  for  delaying 
necessary  improvements.  On the  contrary,  further  trade  libcralisation  would  directly 
contribute to overcoming the crisis.  The Union will therefore continue to pursue its long-
standing market-access requests.  We should make clear that we will view progress in 
meeting them as  an  important indicator of the  credibility  of the  Government's  wider 
commitment  to  reform,  which  will  have  a  major  impact  on  political  perceptions  in 
Europe of  South Korea's restructuring efforts. 
There is still a long way to go before South Korean public opinion becomes as open to 
imports and foreign investment as public opinion in other OECD countries.  The Union 
should  now  work  closely  with  the  Government  in  support  of its  declared  aim  of 
combating  ill-informed  prejudice  towards  imports  and  foreign  companies,  which  the 
authorities  recognise  could  undermine  the  drive  to  attract  foreign  investment,  and 
maintain pressure in this respect. 
In areas  where  the two  sides disagree on trade policy matters, they will  discuss them 
bilaterally in a co-operative manner.  In addition, the Dispute Settlement machinery of 
the  World  Trade  Organisation  remains  available  if  either  party  considers  that 
international trade rules arc  being violated.  The Union has  shown in the past in  such 
cases that it is willing to refer matters to the WTO.  This romains the case. 
As a responsible participant in the world trading system, the Union recognises that trade 
is  a "two-way street".  It is clearly living up to the ASEM Trade and Investment Pledge 
by resisting protectionism.  It is thus contributing to  South Korean efforts to  overcome 
the effects of the  crisis.  Union exports to South Korea fell  by 33% year-on-year in the 
first quarter of 1998 while imports rose 36%. These figures arc dramatic, but they arc not 
Export  subsidies  on  industrial  products;  "import diversification  programme"  banning  certain 
Japanese imports 
6 surprising given the magnitude of the economic shock which produced them. Of course, 
vigilance is warranted to guard against unfair trade practices.  These will continue to be 
dealt with under the Union's anti-dumping and anti-subsidy legislation,  and  the Trade 
Barriers Regulation.  These legal instruments arc fully in compliance with WTO rules. 
The negative trade effects of the crisis will be overcome sooner if the two sides take 
trade-promotion  measures.  On the  Union  side,  the  Commission  will  at  the  earliest 
opportunity start ne_gotiating  a balanced Mutual Recognition Agreement on conformity 
assessment  with  Korea,  in  line  with  the  existing  mandate  from  the  EU  Council  of 
Ministers.  The Union should to this end also positively consider other economic co-
operation activities at Union level, as outlined in section 2.3.4 
2.3.3  A potential ally in the pursuit of global trade liberalisation 
South Korea's economy is highly dependent on external trade. It therefore stands to gain 
from further strengthening of the multililteral trading system.  This remains true after the 
Asian crisis.  Further liberalisation of  trade and investment, supported by predictable and 
transparent multilateral rules would help underpin future economic recovery. 
As the members of  the World Trade Organisation (WTO) move towards a decision on the 
scope  of future  trade  talks,  South  Korea  therefore  has  a  strong  interest  in  working 
alongside  the  Union to  rally  support  for  a  balanced  and  comprehensive  trade  round. 
South  Korea's  formal  support  for  a  Millennium  Round  is  therefore  welcome.  Its 
advocacy in Asia will be valuable in building regional support for a broad-based trade 
agenda.  The lead-up to the third ASEM summit, which South Korea is hosting in 2000, 
should serve as a key platform from which the Union and South Korea can promote the 
benefits of comprehensive negotiations, particularly for Asia.  Dialogue and co-operation 
on WTO issues should be strengthened and should over the next year be a central plank 
in the bilateral relationship. 
Successive multilateral trade negot\ations have shown that the overall benefits outweigh 
the specific concessions individual participants have made.  In order to  benefit from a 
further round of  trade liberalisation, South Korea will thus need to move in several areas. 
One example is industrial tariffs, another is services. In other circumstances, concessions 
of this kind might prove difficult.  But South Korea is well placed to play a leadership 
role  with  the Union in  any new WTO round  because domestic economic imperatives 
seem anyway to  require further liberalisation of the economy.  Moreover, many of the 
issues which may be addressed in the framework of a Millennium Round - investment, 
competition, trade facilitation, other areas of rule-making - are of benefit to  all  WTO 
members, and do not involve any notion of  trading gains for concessions. 
Even before new negotiations, the scope of WTO activity has been growing.  In many of 
the  newer  fields  - trade  facilitation,  electronic  commerce,  transparency  in  public 
procurement - the Union and South Korea have considerable interests in common, and 
these should be pursued through intensified co-operation. The same applies in the context 
of the Information Technology Agreement (IT  A), where a recent survey on application 
by the parties of international standards and conformity assessment-practices in the IT 
sector should now be followed up. 
7 South Korea and the Union (together with Japan and Norway) have ratified the OECD 
Shipbuilding Agreement.  However, its entry into force  is  prevented by the US's non-
ratification.  Nevertheless,  the  sector needs international  disciplines to  restore  normal 
competitive conditions, set a level playing field and avoid ~scalation of injurious pricing 
and subsidies.  In order to achieve this, the Union and South Korea should cooperate 
(with other major shipbuilding countries) and try to find mutually beneficial solutions.  In 
its  document  "Shipbuilding  Policy  - Option  for  the  Future"
6  of April  1997  the 
Commission  took  the  view that  the  implementation  of the  Shipbuilding  Agreement 
without the United States "could bear examination since the USA do not have significant 
merchant shipbuilding capacities." The Commission will study this approach in the near 
fhture taking into account all recent developments and particularly the effects of  the crisis 
in Asia. \Ve should also continue to encourage the United States (and other shipbuilding 
nations) to join the Agreement.  The Commission will also examine to what extent this 
approach  should  be  complemented  by  other  actions  to  promote  fair  competition  in · 
shipbuilding. 
2.3.4  Stepping up bilateral economic co-operation 
Premise 
As  the  Commission  pointed  out  in  its  1994  Communication  on  Asia,  the  Union's 
economic co-operation with non-member countries is based on the  concept of mutual 
benefit for the two sides.  In the case of South Korea co-operation has so far taken place 
e.  g.  in science and technology, in standards and certification and in the customs area. 
There have also been sectoral projects in areas such as automotive and, more recently, 
environmental technology.  For the economic and political reasons set out at the start of 
this document, there is now a strong case for more active pursuit of bilateral economic 
co-operation with South Korea.  The Union has a clear interest in reviewing the present 
situation. 
The-Union  has  in  recent  years  committed  non-negligible  financial  resources  to  its 
bilateral  relationships  in  Asia,  with  South  Korea  a  notable  exception.  This  is  an 
anomalous  sitl,mtion,  and  it  is  not  in  the  Union's  best  interests  for  it  to  continue -
especially now. The cooperation envisaged by the Framework Agreement is of the type 
usually undertaken in relations with developed countries (based on mutual interest, small 
amounts  involved,  public  money  used  as  catalyst  for  cooperation  among  interested 
parties rather than financing projects in their totality etc). Projects of this nature will be 
undertaken by the Commission once the proposal of a Council decision concerning the 
conclusion of the  Framework Agreement is  adopted by the Council. The priorities of 
economic co-operation with South Korea would be: 
• , fostering  expertise  of Korean  language  and  business  culture  among  Union 
enterprises (executive training programme, business internships programme) 
•  increasing  the  transparency  of the  regulatory  environment  in  South  Korea 
(standards, testing and certification procedures) 
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8 •  improving  the  business  environment  in  South  Korea  (investment  rules, 
bankruptcy law, establishment of  European Business Information Centre) 
•  supporting restructuring of the financial sector along market-based lines (legal 
framework  including prudential  regulation and  supervisory practice;  technical 
assistance in credit analysis, risk management) 
•  promoting co-operation between Union and South Korean companies (extension 
to South Korea of  instruments such as Asia-Invest, ECIP, Euro-partenariat) 
•  providing information to  South Korean consumers on the social and economic 
benefits which their country derives from  two-way trade  and investment, thus 
combating hostility towards foreign products and companies 
Finarlcing of  proposed economic co-operation with South Korea 
Any expenditure on economic co-operation with South Korea should initially be financed 
within  existin~  overall  budgetary  allocations  earmarked  for  implementation  of co-
operation agreements with non-member countries.  Clearly such an allocation would not 
be sufficient to pursue all of the abovementioned potential areas of co-operation, but in 
the short term it would allow tangible progress in one or two priority areas. 
Other areas of  co-operation 
Given South Korea's role as a major emitter of  greenhouse gases, the Union should study 
the·  possibility  of  inciuding  it  under  existing  international  energy  co-operation 
·programmes.  This would also serve the mutual interests of both parties.  As a party to 
the  UN  'Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change,  South  Korea's  attention  to 
mitigating greenhouse gas emission are important.  In particular, co-operation on energy 
efficiency  measures,  on the  development  of non- or low-polluting  alternative  energy 
sources, on the reductions of emissions from vehicles and similar topics should form part 
of a flexible environmental co-:operation agenda.  In addition, as parties to the Climate 
Change Convention, the EU and South Korea have a common interest in devising co-
operative policies in support of  global objectives in that context. 
In  the  customs  field,  a  bilateral  Agreement  on  Customs  Co-operation  and  Mutual 
Administrative Assistance entered into force on 1 May 1997.  This agreement contributes 
to trade facilitation and to the fight against fraud. 
Despite the current crisis, South Korea remains a world-class player in  many areas of 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT).  Furthermore, the country's ongoing 
transformation into  an information-oriented society has  accelerated the  introduction of 
ambitious programmes of technology development in ICT.  The Union should consider 
strengthening  dialogue  with  South  Korea  on  various  pol.icy  issues  related  to  the 
information society.· 
3  Engaging an emerging political player in Asia 
3.1  Political relations between the Union and South Korea:  an overview 
During  1998, the new South K~rean Government has paid considerable attention to its 
bilateral relationships with important players in the East Asian region and with the US. 
9 Since  April,  there  have  been  Presidential  visits  to  Washington,  Tokyo  and  Beijing. 
Relations  with Japan in  particular have noticeably wanned, with agreement on a  far-
reaching joint action plan between the two governments and_ resolution of  a long-standing 
1ishcries  dispute.  This  active  diplomacy  indicates  that  South  Korea  under  its  new 
leadership is being seen as an increasingly significant regional and international actor. . 
In  addition,  tensions  with  North  Korea  and  concerns  over  North  Korea's  nuclear 
intentions  have  served  as  a  stark  reminder that  the  situation  on the  Peninsula  is  of 
. concern for the world as a whole, not only for neighbouring countries and for those with 
a long-standing security involvement like the USA. 
These developments have raised the relative weight of  political affairs within the Union's 
bilateral  relationship  with South Korea.  It is  therefore  not surprising  that  its  bilateral 
relations  with  the  Union  are  no  longer  solely  dominated  by  trade.Signature  of the · 
Framework Agreement on Trade and Co-operation in October 1996 was accompanied by 
a  Joint Declaration on Political  Dialogue which put existing arrangements on a  more 
formal footing. 
Bilateral dialogue has been complemented by ASEM, in which South Korea has played a 
leading  part  on  the  Asian  side.  This  has  become  a  substantive  process  boosting 
economic, political and cultural ties between Europe and Asia. 
3.2  Recent political developments in South Korea and on the Peninsula 
Little more than a decade ago, South Korea succeeded in establishing democracy, despite 
a  traumatic  history  in the  second half of the twentieth century,  which has comprised 
fratricidal war and prolonged military rule.  There has been a gradual strengthening of  the 
free  institutions  of civil  society.  Further progress  since  initial  democratisation  was 
illustrated by the Presidential election of  December 1997 and ensuing peaceful transfer of 
power to the opposition for the first time siryce the early 1960s. 
The South's relations with North Korea deteriorated in the middle part of this decade, 
after  a  false  dawn  in  the  early  1990s.  Tensions  have  been  high  in  recent  years, 
underlining  that the  1953  Annistice cannot be taken for  granted indefinitely.  Whilst 
peaceful  reunification remains a  distant prospect, Kim Dae-jung  is  seeking to  engage 
North Korea in dialogue and trade, both bilaterally and internationally.  His belief is that 
engagement of North Korea is the best means to avoid unpredictable external actions or 
an internal political or economic collapse -either scenario would have dramatic negative 
consequences. 
3.3  Updating political relations with South Korea 
3.3.1  Working together to reduce tensions on the Peninsula 
Premise 
There arc  no  short-term prospects of instability on the Korean Peninsula abating.  The 
Union  should  continue  to  exchange  views  closely  with  Seoul  regarding  the  security 
situation.  This is because of South Korea's direct stake, and because its policies are a 
key variable dctcnnining the behaviour of the North. In developing its policies towards 
10 North. Korea,  the Union should seek to  support and promote the  constructive  policies 
being pursued by Seoul since the start of 1998. 
Increased risks of  instability 
A formal state of war has persisted since the 1950s, and North Korea's armed forces arc 
among  the  world's  largest  (1.1  million  standing  troops).  In  the  early  1990s,  North 
Korea's externally-subsidised command economy began to collapse as preferential non-
market trade with the Soviet Union and China dried up. GDP is estimated to have fallen 
by over 50% since  1992  (source:  UNDP).  North Korea also triggered an international 
crisis  in  1993-4  when  it  threatened  withdrawal  from  the  international  nuclear  non-
proliferation  regime,  amid  evidence  that  it  had  been  pursuing  a  nuclear-weapons 
programme. 
For four years since the death of Kim Il-sung, there was formally a political vacuum, but · 
in September 1998 leadership finally passed firmly into the hands of his son, Kim Jong-
il.  The implications of  this change arc as yet unclear. 
The re!>ponse of  the international community 
The USA  and  South Korea have  countered increased  instability  with  firm  deterrence 
against a possible military threat. At the same time, they have stepped up efforts to find a 
lasting  peace  settlement  to  replace  the  1953  Armistice.  Four-Party  Talks
7  formally 
opened in December 1997 but have reconvened only intermittently and made very slow 
progress.  After breaking  off in  1994,  Inter-Korean Dialogue  briefly resumed  in  April 
1998 but has since faltered. 
The nuclear crisis was addressed in October 1994 by an Agreed Framework between the 
US and North Korea.  The Korean peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) 
was established subsequently to  replace North Korea's reactors (from which weapons-
grade plutonium can be easily extracted) with two more proliferation-resistant reactors 
which  will  come  under  the  supervision  of the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency. 
Until  the  first  reactor  is  built,  KEDO  is  to  supply  500,000  tonnes  of heavy  fuel  oil 
ann.ually  as  an  interim  energy  alternative.  KEDO's activities  contribute  to  - and  are 
conditional  on  - respect  by  North  Korea  for  the  vital  nuclear  non-proliferation 
commitments it made in 1994 . 
. 
. The international community has also  granted considerable quantities of food  aid
8  and 
other humanitarian assistance to North Korea.  Natural disasters have aggravated food 
shortages but the underlying cause is structural. 
The  Union's role maintaining peace and stability on the Peninsula 
The Union has demonstrated its commitment to security in East Asia by its substantial 
role to date in helping to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. 
The Four Parties are  the  two Koreas, the US  and China - de facto the main  combatants in  the 
1950-3 Korean War 
Between  1995  and  1997, the_UN's  World Food  Programme delivered 637,000 tonnes of food 
grain, worth $ 207 million, to North Korea.  In January 1998, it appealed for  658,000 tonnes of 
food aid products worth $3 78 million, for the period :'-pril 1998-March 1999 . 
.11 Solid political backing was given to international efforts to resolve the nuclear crisis.  In 
1997 the  Union (through EURATOM) formally joined KEDO.  75  MECU
9  have been 
pledged to KEDO for the period up to 2000.  Though smal!er than the long-term overall 
pledges made by South Korea, Japan and the US, this is still a substantial and sustained 
1inancial contribution to a project of  vital importance for internatinnal peace and security. 
The  EU  is  also  consistently  supportive  of the  activities  and  obligations  of  the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in North Korea. 
Recent  events have  underlined  the  vital  importance of proliferation  issues  and  of the 
Union's continuing participation in efforts to find solutions. EU participation in KEDO to 
date has been well received by the US, Japan and South Korea at the highest political 
level.  There  are  strong  hopes  and  wishes  from  these  partners  that  the  EU  contin~e 
supporting KEDO after the end of  the current agreement.  Provided North Korea respects 
its nuclear non-proliferation commitments, it would clearly be in the Union's interests to  · 
.continue supporting KEDO after 2000, and it should soon consider on what terms and at 
what level it would wish to do so. 
The  Union  has  provided  medical  assistance  to North Korea,  on strictly ·humanitarian 
grounds.  Although the  regime prevents  an  objective assessment of the  full  extent of 
humanitarian needs, there clearly are such problems in North Korea.  Delivering medical 
aid  on  humanitarian  grounds  in  a  principled  and  efficient  way  has  however  been 
hampered  by,  for  example,  difficulty  of direct  access  to  beneficiaries.  A  number of 
medical  non-governmental  organisations  have  recently  withdrawn  from  the  country, 
referring to these problems. 
ln addition, the Union is a leading contributor of  food aid but unlike other major donors it 
is specifically seeking to address the underlying causes offood shortages.  With technical 
assistance, pilot projects and conditionality related to the agricultural sector- as well as 
traditional food aid - its 30 MECU package for 1998  recognises that food aid alone is ·at 
best only a short-term solution to North Kor~a's problems. 
These  problems  are  severe.  In  1995,  1996  and  1997,  natural  disasters  aggravated 
underlying structural shortages.  In contrast, climactic conditions do not appear to  have 
negatively affected the present  1998  harvest to  any significant extent.  However,  non-
sustainable agricultural practices and,  in particular, failed economic policies mean that 
North Korea will not be capable of  feeding itself in the medium term.  Any future support 
by the Union should therefore seek to encourage policy adjustments in North Korea.  As 
long as the need for such steps is acknowledged and acted on by the authorities, targeted 
food  aid  and  food-security  measures  by  the  Union would in  principle  be justified to 
accompany such measures.  Another key  issue  would  be proper respect  for  standard, 
internationally-accepted practices for the delivery of  aid (monitoring conditions, access to 
beneficiaries, etc). 
ln parallel with these actions to  defuse tensions, the Union remains a firm  supporter of 
the Four-Party Talks and of  Inter-Korean Dialogue.  In line with this basic policy and the 
Of  which 5 MECU under a Joint Action of  the EU's 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
·12 "sunshine policy" which South Korea has begun to pursue under President Kim Dae-jung 
since his election, the Union should look favourably on efforts to promote North Korean 
engagement  with  the  international  community,  both  p~litically  and  economically, 
through involvement in regional security bodies (such as the ASEAN Regional Forum) 
and in international financial institutions. 
Beyond this,  the Union could  in  principle  consider other practical  action  to. promote 
North  Korean  cnga~ement internationally.  This  could  for  example  take  the  form  of 
bilateral measures by the Union to underpin greater economic integration of  North Korea 
into the international community.  Such measures would also  be likely to  improve the 
climate for co-operation on the Peninsula. If there were to be progress in certain areas, 
the Union should not exclude measures such as granting autonomous trade concessions to 
North Korea or extending development assistance. Through such a response, the Union 
would  help  signal  to  North  Korea  that  there  are  greater  mutual  benefits  in genuine · 
constructive  co-operation  with  the  international  community  than  in  continued 
confrontation. 
However,  this  would  be  premature  in  present  circumstances.  There  remain  concerns 
about North Korea's missile exports to unstable regions and disturbing reports of grave 
human rights violations, which independent monitors are prevented from verifying.  A 
willingness  to  co-operate  more  constructively  with  the  IAEA  would  go  a  long  way 
towards  proving  that  North  Korea  can  be  considered  a  responsible  member of the 
international community.  The nature of a suspect underground facility at Kumchangni 
must also be clarified.  Finally, a new more flexible attitude in inter-Korean relations and 
in Four-Party Talks is also important. 
The Union has recently decided to initiate a cautious political dialogue with Pyongyang 
at the level of  officials.  This supports efforts to engage North Korea internationally, and 
will be used to press for progress in Four-Party Talks ar.d Inter-Korean Dialogue.  Other 
Union concerns vis-a-vis North Korea (e.g. human rights, proliferation, etc) will also be 
part of  any dialogue. 
3.3.2  One of the leaders of EU-Asia rapprochement 
Recent Presidential statements underline the potential degree of common thinking that 
now exists between the Union and South Korea. This is a major development.  During his 
first  visits  abroad as  President,  Kim has  referred  to  the close  links between political 
freedom and lasting economic prosperity, stressing that a successful market economy and 
a liberal democracy are mutually inter-dependent. The Gov~mment's  campaign to render 
the economy more open and transparent should be seen in the context of statements such 
as these: economic reform in South Korea appears to be part of a wider political project 
to strengthen the country's democracy. 
Such attitudes on the part of  the South Korean Government are in line with the objectives 
pursued by the Union in its Common Foreign and Security Policy
10  and there is now a 
10  The objectives of the  Union'~ Common Foreign  and  Security Policy  include safeguarding the 
common  values,  fundamental  interests  and  independence  of  the  Union;  developing  and 
consolidating democracy and  the  rule  of law,  and  respect  for  human  rights  and  fundamental 
freedoms; preserving peace and strengthening international security. 
13 constructive political dialogue between the two sides.  Annual Ministerial meetings and 
briefings between senior officials should be maintained.  There would however be scope 
for intensifying political dialogue ,through a first summit meeting at Presidential level, in 
the margins of the third Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) which will take place in Seoul, in 
October 2000.  This would be a strong and highly visible indication of Union support for 
the policy of  President Kim and his allies. 
The Korean Peninsula will remain at the heart of bilateral political dialogue.  Beyond 
this, the two sides would have a clear interest in reviewing other regional issues in Asia 
and  in  Europe,  as  well  as  horizontal  security  matters,  such  as  prolifer:::ttion  and  arms 
control.  Human rights would also  be an important area of political  dialogue  and  co-
operation, where there could potentially be common ground.  The Commission notes that 
although South Korea's own record has in many respects improved considerably since 





The  country's National  Security  Law is  vague  and  therefore  potentially  open  to 
abuse by the authorities:  for example, "benefiting" or "praising" the North Korean 
Government may lead to imprisonment. 
Despite an extensive amnesty on 15 August 1998, there are still at least 17 long-term 
prisoners who have been held for 28 years or more for more serious violations of the 
National Security Law, despite now posing little apparent threat to national security. 
Despite recent substantive improvements, South Korean labour law still falls short of 
core conventions ofthe International Labour Organisation. 
Although the death penalty has not be~n applied since Kim Dae-jung took office, it 
remains on the statute books and 23 prisoners were executed in 1997. 
President Kim was formerly a political prisoner and courageously defended human rights 
during military rule.  It is  therefore reasonable for the international community to  have 
high expectations that he will deliver further improvements in this area now that he is in 
power. 
Beyond  politic1!  dialogue,  bilateral  tics  are  defined  by  the  Framework  Agreement on 
Trade  and  Co-operation,  signed  in  October  1996.  The  Agreement  is  a  landmark  in 
bilateral  relations  which should improve  the  climate  for  business  and  investment and 
boost wide-ranging co-operation with South, Korea. It commits the two sides to working 
towards  improved  conditions  for  access  to  each other's markets  (including  services). 
There  arc  specific  provisions  on a  wide range of areas, including  maritime  transport, 
shipbuilding, intellectual property rights, technical regulations, drags, money laundering 
etc..  Further  efforts  are  now needed  on the  European  side  in  order  to  complete  the 
ratification  process.  This  would  formalise  the relationship  and  establish  institutional 
machinery,  comprising the Commission and  the Member States  along  with the  South 
Korean authorities, in order to oversee all aspects. 
The  Union  and  South  Korea  arc  co-operating  closely  and  effectively  within  the 
burgeoning ASEM process.  Sol!th Korea has  played a  leading  role  on  the  Asian side 
14 since  the  outset,  for  example  helping  achieve  consensus  m  favour  of  including 
meaningful political dialogue within the ASEM framework. 
This role is set to continue, as South Korea will host the third Asia-Europe Meeting in 
Seoul in 2000, and is already one of the co-ordinators on the Asian side.  It therefore has 
the potential to be a key player as the participants in ASEM face up to various challenges 
ahead.  These  include implementation of the work prograr;.me  agreed  at  the  second 
summit in London in April 1998, in particular the Trade Facilitation Action Plan and the 
Investment Promotion Action Plan.  Further development of political  dialogue within 
ASEM \Viii also be a priority. 
Since December 1995, South Korea has had the  status of "Partner for  Co-operation" 
within  the  Organisation  for  Security  and  Co-operation  in  Europe  (OSCE),  helping 
familiarise South Korea with the OSCE's values and commitments.  Current work on the · 
Charter  on  European  Security  strongly  emphasises  the  regional  dimension,  possibly 
opening the way for closer co-operation between the OSCE and the ASEAN Regional 
Forum.  South Korea and Japan- the other Asian "Partner for Co-operation" - could be 
expected to play a  leading role in that context.  This would constitute an additional -
multilateral -dimension in the political dialogue between the EU and South Korea. 
4  Conclusions and summary of recommendations 
The economic and political importance of the Union's relationship with South Korea is 
dear.  It  is  also  clear that there  arc  particular reasons  for  seeking  to  strengthen  this 
relationship  at  this  time.  The  Commission  therefore  makes  the  following 
recommendations: 
ECONOMIC 
Supporting the reform and recovery process in South Korea 
The Union has made a substantial contribution to stabilisation after the financial  crisis 
started.  It should continue with firm political support to restructuring. 
In the best interests of Europe and of South Korea, the Union should co!ltinue to  make 
firm  but constructive criticism where the pace or scope of reform  is inadequate. It is 
particularly necessary to ensure that the banking system will apply market"principles and 
avoid non-profitable investments. 
The Union should remain vigilant to ensure that South Korea is respecting the conditions 
attached to  international financial  assistance.  These funds  must not result, directly or 
indirectly, in industrial subsidies which delay necessary restructuring and capacity cuts. 
Any such interventionism would not be politically or economically acceptable  to  the 
Union. 
Improving marJ{et access in the interests of both partners 
The Union should continue to push forcefully for lifting of  trade barriers.  They impede 
efforts to  reinvigorate the  South Korean economy and  deny business opportunities to 
15 Union companies.  It should be made clear that progress in this field will be an essential 
clement of  any improvement of  relations. 
There  should  be  particular  emphasis  on removing  and  simplifying  over-burdensome 
regulations which continue to hamper economic activity in South Korea. 
There is a long way to go before Korean public opinion becomes as open to imports and 
foreign investment as public opinion in the Union. Pressure should be maintained for 
continuing  Government efforts  to  combat ill-informed prejudice towards  imports and 
foreign companies.  Such efforts should be supported. 
Unfair trade practices will continue to be dealt with under the Union's anti-dumping and 
anti-subsidy legislation and the Tnde Barriers Regulation, which are fully in compliance 
with WTO rules. 
Other actions are needed to promote two-way trade. In particular, the Commission will at 
the  earliest opportunity start negotiating a  Mutual Recognition Agreement with South 
Korea, in line with the existing mandate from the EU Council of  Ministers. 
A potential ally in pursuit of global trade liberalisation 
The Union should work with South Korea to  maintain its commitment towards and to 
enlist further worldwide support for a new round of  comprehensive trade negotiations. 
In this context, the Union should consult fully with South Korea on areas where it will 
need to make progress in future negotiations e.g. industrial tariffs, services, etc. 
The  two  side  should  co-operate  on  new  areas  being  studied  in  the  WTO  - trade 
facilitation, investment, competition, electronic commerce, etc 
In the absence of US ratification of the OECD Shipbuilding Agreement, the two sides -
along  with  other  major  shipbuilding  nations  - should  seek  how  to  restore  normal 
c:ompetitive conditions in the sector, on the basis of  the Agre~ment's main provisions. 
Stepping up bilateral economic co-operation 
The Union should step up  bilateral  economic  co-operation, extending to  South Korea 
existing  EU  economic  co-operation  initiatives  covering  other  Asian  countries.  An 
Executive Training Programme for South Korea should be a cornerstone of co-operation 
activity. 
The  cooperation  envisaged  by  the  Framework  Agreement  is  of the  type  usually 
undertaken  in  relations  with  developed  countries  (based  on  mutual  interest,  small 
amounts  involved,  public  money  used  as  catalyst  for  cooperation  among  interested 
parties rather than financing projects in their totality etc). Projects of this nature will be 
·undertaken by the Commission ·once the. proposal of a Council decision concerning the 
conclusion of  the Framework Agreement is adopted by the Council. 
16 Given  the  expressed  mutual  interest,  South  Korea  should  be  further  involved  in 
developments regarding the  Global  Information  Society,  including  those  in electronic 
commerce. 
Since South Korea's is a major emitter of greenhouse gases, the Union should consider 
including it in its existing international energy co-operation programmes. 
POLITICAL 
Working together to.reduce tensions on the Peninsula 
The Union should maintain its long-standing support for the Four-Party Talks and Inter-
Korean Dialogue, in order to promote peace and reconciliation on the Peninsula. 
The Union .should  continue to assist in addressing the underlying  causes of the  food 
shortages in North Korea. 
It should also maintain its  active involvement in the work of KEDO, provided North 
Korea respects  its  nuclear non-proliferation pledges.  The basis  for continuing Union 
participation in KEDO after the year 2000 should be considered. 
The Union should promote North Korean engagement with the international community 
and progressive opening and adjustment in North Korea. 
The Union should embark upon a judicious programme to develop political contacts with 
North Korea in support of  the Four-Party Talks and inter-Korean Dialogue: Such contacts 
should  also  be actively  used to  register  other  Union concerns  vis-a-vis  North Korea 
(proliferation, human rights, etc) 
One of the leaders of EU-Asian rapprochement 
All those involved in the ratification process should step up efforts for an early entry into 
force of  the important Framework Agreement on Trade and Co-operation. 
Existing close co-operation within ASEM should be stepped up in the run-up to the third 
ASEM summit which South Korea will host in 2000. · 
Bilateral political dialogue between the Union and South Korea should be reinforced, 
notably by holding a summit meeting, in the margins of ASEM III in Seoul (October, 
2000). 
This political dialogue should focus in particular on the Korean peninsula where mutual 
interests arc strongest but also on regional situations in Europe and Asia and horizontal 
security issues (arms control, proliferation).  · 
It should also cover human rights, where· South Korea has made significant progress in 
many  areas  but  where  certain  concerns  still  remain  (National  Security  Law,  death 
penalty, non-ratification of  core conventions of  the International Labour Organisation). 
17 FINANCIAL STATEMENT 
1  TITLE OF OPERATION 
Communication:  European Union policy towards the Republic of  Korea 
2 BUDGET  HEADING INVOLVED 
B7-6601 -Co-operation agreements with third countries 
3 LEGAL BASIS 
The cooperation envisaged by the Framework Agreement is of the type usually , 
undertaken in relations with developed countries (based on mutual interest, small 
amounts . involved,  public  money  used  as  catalyst  for  cooperation  among 
interested parties rather than financing projects in their totality etc). Projects of 
this nature will be undertaken by the Commission once tqe proposal of a Council 
decision concerning the conclusion of the Framework Agreement is  adopted by 
the Council. 
4  DESCRIPTION OF OPERATION 
4.1  General objective 
The Communication proposes updating the Europe<m  Union's economic 
and political relations with the Republic of Korea (South Korea) to take 
account of changed circumstances after the financial crisis and the recent 
Presidential election. 
In this framework, it is proposed to step up the Community's ecoriomic 
co-operation with the Republic of Korea in order to  pursue the mutual 
interests of  both parties. 
Subject  to  the  availability of resources  and after due  consultation with 
interested  parties,  the  economic  co-operation  objectives  of  the 
Communication would be pursued through a variety of projects aimed at 
some or all of  the following: 
o  fo~tering  expertise  of Korean  language  and  business  culture  among 
Union enterprises  (executive training programme, business  internships 
programme) 
o  increasing  the  transparency  of the  regulatory  environment  m  South 
Korea (standards, testing and certification procedures) 
18 •  improving the business environment in South Korea (investment rules, 
b;:mkruptcy  law,  establishment  of  European  Business  Information 
Centre) 
•  supporting restructuring of the financial sector along market-based lines 
(legal  framework;  technical  assistance  in  credit  analysis,  risk 
management) 
o  promoting  co-operation  between  Union and  South  Korean  companies 
(extension to South Korea of  Asia-Invest, ECIP, Euro-partenariat) · 
•  providing  information  to  South Korean  consumers  on  the  social  and 
economic benefits which their country derives from two-way trade and 
investment,  thus  combating  hostility  towards  foreign  products  and 
compames 
4.2  Period covered and arrangements for renewal 
Indeterminate. 
5 CLASSIFICATION OF EXPENDITURE OR REVENUE 
5.1  Compulsory/Non-compulsory expenditure 
Non-compulsory expenditure. 
5.2  Differentiated/Non-differentiated appropriations 
Differentiated appropriations. 
5.3  Type of revenue involved 
Not applicable 
6 TYPE OF EXPENDITURE OR REVENUE 
The economic co-operation objectives of the Communication would be primarily 
pursued  .  through  service  contracts  assigned  by  the  appropriate  tendering 
procedures,  in  line  with  Community  law  and  the  internal  procedures  of the 
Commission.  Subsidies may also  be granted in support of specific operations, 
with appropriate co-financing from other sources. 
?FINANCIAL IMPACT 
7.1  Method  of  calculating  total  cost  of  operation  (relation  between 
individual and total costs) 
19 The  estimated  cost  of the  flagship  project  proposed  for  bilateral  economic 
cooperation,  the  Executive  Training  Programme  for  Korea,  derives  from  a 
feasibility  study  conducted . by  Deloitte  and  Touche  and  submitted  to  the 
C9mmission services in June  1997. The figure of 1.0-1.5 MECU per annum  is  at 
the lower end of the range recommended by the consultant (minimum 1.5  MECU 
per annum).  The  initial  figure  is  lower  (1.0  MECU)  because  the  Commission 
services  have  identified  some  cost-reductions  for  an  initial  phase.  If the 
programme is  successful, the number of participants should be expanded beyond 
the initial low level (2 x 8 participants per year) in due course, thus raising the cost 
to around 1.5 MECU per year. 
The costs of the other proposed projects are estimates deriving the Commission's . 
experience in sectoral technical-assistance programmes and  business co-operation 
activities with other Asian countries. 
Some of these programmes (financial-sector  restlilct~ng, business environment) 
11re expected to be time-limited- or at least degressive in cost - if the programmes 
are successful.  The launching of some programmes is deferred until year 2001  or 
year 2002. 
f:---.)' 
.:  2o 7.2  Itemised brea){down of cost 
Breakdown  Year  2001 
2000 
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Commitment appropriations ECU million 
(at current prices) 




1.5  1.5  1.5  7.5 
0.5  0.5  0.5  2.5 
0.2  0.2  0.2  0.8 
0  0  0  1.0 
0.5  0.5  0.5  2.0 
0.3  0.3  0.3  1.2 
3.0  3.0  3.0  15.0 
21 
. 7.3 Operational expenditure for studies, experts etc. included in Part B of the budget 
Commitment appropriations ECU million (at current prices) 
Year  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 and  Total 
2000 
subs. Yrs 
'  -Studies  0  0.1  0.1  0  0  0  0.2 
- Meetings  of 
experts  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
- Conferences  and 
congresses  0  0.2  0.2·  0  0  0  0.6 
- Information  and 
publications 
0.2  0  0  0.3  0.3  0.3  1.1 
To  till  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  1.7 
7.4  Schedule of commitment and payment appropriations 
ECU million 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 and  Total 
subs. yrs 




year 2000  0.5  0  0  0  0  0  0.5 
2001  0.5  0.5  0  0  0  0  1.0 
2002  0  1.0  1.0  0  0  0  2.0 
2003  0  0.5  1.5  1.0  0  0  3.0 
2004  0  0  0.5  1.5  1.0  0  3.0 
2005  0  0  0  0.5  2.0  3.0  5.5 
and subs. yrs 
Total  1.0  2.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  15 
22 8  FRAUD PREVENTION MEASURES 
The activities carried out will be  carefully monitored by the Commission services 
before  any  payment  is  made.  This  control  takes  full  account  of contractual 
obligations  and  principles  of economy  and  good  financial  management.  Certain 
.  agreements  may  also  require  submission  of financial  accounts  certified  by  the 
auditors appointed by the managing body of the professional association to which a 
subsidy has been granted. 
9  ELEMENTS OF COST-EF-FECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
9.1  Specific and quantified objectives; target population 
•  In  order  to  foster  expertise  of Korean  language  and  business  culture 
among Union enterprises,  an  Executive training  programme for  Korea 
would be established.  Consideration should also be  given to extending 
to  Korea  the  EU  business  internships  programme  currently  covering 
some other Asian countries.  The target population of these measures is 
the EU-based companies interested in exporting to or investing in Korea. 
•  In  order to  increase the transparency of the regulatory environment in 
Korea,  technical  assistance  could  be  provided  to  Korean  bodies 
responsible  for  standards,  testing  and  certification  procedures.  They 
would be the target population of  this measure. 
•  In order to improve the business environment in South Korea technical 
assistance  could be provided on investment rules  and  bankruptcy  law. 
The  Korean  administration  would  be  the  target  population  of such 
measures.  In addition, a European Business Information Centre could be 
established.  EU  companies  operating  in  Korea  would  be  the  target 
population of this particular measure. 
•  IJt  order to  support restructuring  of the  financial  sector along  market-
based  lines,  technical  assistance  could  be  provided  on  the  legal 
framework  for  banking  regulation  (target  population:  financial 
regulatory  body)  and  on  credit  analysis,  risk management,  etc  (target 
population:  Korean financial institutions). 
•  In order to promote co-operation between Union and Korean companies, 
Asia-Invest, ECIP, Euro-partenariat could be  extended to  Korea (target 
population:  EU companies interested in doing business in Korea - their 
Korean partner companies. 
•  In  order to  combat hostility towards foreign  products  and  companies, 
information campaigns could be run providing infonnation to consumers 
23 on the social and economic benefits which Korea derives from two-way 
trade and investment.  Korean consumers would be the target population. 
9.2  Grounds for the operation 
The  European  Union's  economic  presence  in  Korea  (trade  flows; 
investment stocks) is lagging behind that of the United States and Japan. 
In view ofthe medium- and long-term growth potential of  this market and 
its likely future importance as a hub in the East Asian region this state of 
affairs  threatens  to  adversely  affect  the  European  Union's  future 
·prosperity. 
Economic co-operation activities which serve the best interests of  the two 
sides appear the best way to ensure a more adequate economic presence of 
the European Union in Korea.·  Whilst economic co-operation at the level 
of the  Member States should certainly be encouraged, there  are  certain 
actions  identified  above  which,  by  reason  of the  economies  of scale 
expected or because of  the synergies which would flow from action at EU-
level, should be pursued through Community instruments. 
Successful implementation of  the economic co-operation actions identified 
should  lead  to  a  consolidation  of economic  ties  between  the  EU  and 
Korea,  in  particular  through  increased  trade  and  investment  flows. 
Although the development of these flows will be a useful indicator of  the 
success or otherwise of economic co-operation activities proposed in the 
Communication,  they  will  also  be  affected  by'  other variables  (such  as 
macroeconomic developments in Korea, the EU and in other main trading 
pa~ners). 
9.3  Monitoring and evaluation of  the operation 
Methods of  control (submission of  reports, etc.) will be included in all agreements or 
contracts between the Commission and beneficiaries of  subsidies, contractors and the 
like. Close collaboration with the associations responsible will be maintained during 
the  implementation  of projects.  The  norm  is  that  a  Commission  representative 
attends  important events  financed  under such co-operation projects to  ensure that 
activities are carried out in accordance with the signed agreement. 
Specific performance indicators will be developed for individual projects and would 
include, for example: 
•  Number of EU business people developing knowledge of Korean language and 
business practice through participation in ETP Korea and/or business internship 
programmes; 
24 •  In  connection  with  technical  assistance  activities  (regulatory  and  business 
environment, financial sector), the indicators would be specific improvements in 
Korea's administrative infrastructure, leading to improvements in the regulatory 
framework; 
•  In  connection  with  business  promotion  activities,  indicators  could  include 
number of EU and Korean companies participating and, as appropriate, number 
of  co-operation agreements ensuing. 
Monitoring provisions based on such indicators will be systematically incorporated 
as an integral part of project design.  Multi-annual operations will as necessary be 
adapted to take account of  the results of  these monitoring activities. 
10  ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE (SECTION III, PART A OF THE BUDGET) 
Actual mobilization of the necessary administrative resources will depend on the 
Commission's annual decision on the allocation of resources, taking into account 
the number of  staff  and additional amounts authorized by the budgetary authority. 
10.1  Effect on the number of posts 
Type of  post  ,  Staff to  be  assigned  to  Source  Duration 
managing the operation 
Permanent  TemEorary  Existing  _Additional 
·Eosts  EOStS  resources  in  resources 
the  DG  or 
department 
concerned 
Officials  or  A  I  1  Indefinite 
temporary 
staff  B  0.25  0.25 
c  1  1 
Other  resources  1  1 
(DNE:  budgetary 
item A  7-003) 
Total  2.25  1  3.25 
25 10.2  Overall financial impact of [additional] human resources* 
Amounts  Method of  calculation 
Officials  243.000  2.25 X  108.000 X  1 
Temporary staff 
Other resources (budget heading A7-003))  37.000 
Total  280.000 
*  Existing resources required to  manage the operation (calculation based on titles Al, 
A2, A4, AS and A 7)-no additional human resources are entailed. 
26 10.3  Increase in other administrative expenditure as a result of the operation** 
Budget  DO  Amounts 
heading  concerned 
A- IX  12392 
02410-
11-09 
A7010  DO I  24880 ECU 
DG III  12440 ECU 
DGVI  6220 ECU 
Total  55932 ECU 
Method of  calculation 
If possible,  part of the  necessary  contacts  with  the 
Korean  authorities  will  take  the  form  of  video-
conferencing.  For countries in East Asia,  this costs 
approximately  8400  BF  per hour per line.  Three 
lines are necessary for a good quality link.  Around 
20  hours of talks  ~nnually in this  format  might be 
envisaged,  giving  a  total  BF  cost  of 504000  BF. 
This  was  converted  using  the  official  BF  /ECU 
exchange rate of  40.6725 BF=1 ECU. 
Number of additional  missions  (14)  multiplied  for 
the average cost of mission to Seoul, Korea ( 111507 
BF for transport and 7500 BF per diem, for a total of 
126507  BF  for  a  two-day  mission.  Applying  the 
official  BF/ECU  exchange  rate  of  40.6725  BF/1 
ECU the  above  amount is  equal  to  311 0  ECU per 
mission).  · 
The total number of missions (14) includes missions 
by DGI (8), DGIII (4), DOVI (2). 
**The credits will be found within the existing envelopes of  the services concerned. 
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